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Cheng Guo, Chin-Chen Chang, Chuan Qin

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4	Cheng Guo ¹ , Chin-Chen Chang ^{2,3} , Chuan Qin ²
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6	¹ Department of Computer Science,
7	National Tsing-Hua University, Hsinchu, 30013 Taiwan
8	E-mail: guo8016@gmail.com
9	
10	
11	Department of Information Engineering and Computer Science, Feng Chia University Taichung 40724 Taiwan
13	E-mail: alan3c@gmail.com
14	
15	
16	³ Department of Biomedical Imaging and Radiological Science,
17	Chinese Medical University, 40402, Taiwan
18	E-mail: alan3c@gmail.com
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	Correspondence address:
27	Professor Chin-Chen Chang
28	Department of Information Engineering and Computer Science,
29	Feng Chia University,
30	No. 100 Wenhwa Rd., Seatwen,
31	Taichung 40724, Taiwan, R.O.C.
32	Email: alan3c@gmail.com
33	TEL: 886-4-24517250 ext. 3790
34	FAX: 886-4-27066495
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A Multi-threshold Secret Image Sharing Scheme 38 **Based on MSP** 39 40 Cheng Guo¹, Chin-Chen Chang^{2,3}, Chuan Qin² 41 42 43 Abstract: 44 In this paper, we consider the problem of secret image sharing in groups with 45 multi-threshold access structure. In such a case, multiple secret images can be shared among a group of participants, and each secret image is associated with a (potentially 46 47 different) access structure. We employ Hsu et al.'s multi-secret sharing scheme based 48 on monotone span programs (MSP) to propose a multi-threshold secret image sharing 49 scheme. In our scheme, according to the real situation, we pre-defined the 50 corresponding access structures. Using Hsu et al.'s method, we can achieve shadow 51 data from multiple secret images according to these access structures. Then, we utilize 52 the least significant bits (LSB) replacement to embed these shadow data into the cover 53 image. Each secret image can be reconstructed losslessly by collecting a 54 corresponding qualified subset of the shadow images. The experimental results 55 demonstrate that the proposed scheme is feasible and efficient. 56 57 **Keywords:** Multi-threshold secret sharing, access structure, secret image sharing, 58 monotone span programs 59

2

1. Introduction

61	Secret sharing was introduced in 1979 by Shamir (1979) and Blakley (1979), who
62	developed two different methods to construct threshold secret sharing schemes based
63	on the Lagrange interpolating polynomials and the linear projective geometry,
64	respectively. By using a secret sharing scheme, a secret can be protected among a
65	finite set of participants in such a way that only qualified sets of participants, which
66	form the access structure of the scheme, can jointly reconstruct the secret.
67	Naor and Shamir (1995) developed visual cryptography that encrypts a secret
68	image into some shares (transparencies) such that the secret image can be revealed to
69	visual perception only by stacking any qualified subset of the shares without
70	performing any cryptographic computations. However, in their scheme, the shadow
71	images that are comprised of black and white pixels are meaningless. The interested
72	reader can find more information about visual cryptography in (Yang, 2004; Wang
73	and Su, 2006; Wang et al., 2007). In 2004, Lin and Tsai (2004) proposed a novel
74	method for sharing secret images based on a (t, n) threshold scheme that had
75	additional steganographic capabilities. In their scheme, shadow images are
76	meaningful, and they look like the camouflage image. Furthermore, an image
77	watermarking technique is employed to embed fragile watermark signals into the
78	shadow images. Therefore, during the secret image reconstruction process, each

79	shadow image can be verified for its fidelity. In 2007, Yang, Chen, Yu, and Wang
80	(2007) presented a scheme to improve authentication ability and improve the quality
81	of shadow images. However, the improved scheme resulted in the distortion of the
82	visual quality of the shadow images. In 2009, Lin, Lee, and Chang (2009) employed
83	the modulus operator to embed secret data into a cover image. In their scheme, some
84	meaningful shadow images with satisfactory quality were obtained, and both the
85	secret image and the cover image could be reconstructed losslessly. In addition, they
86	utilized Rabin's signature to generate a certificate aimed at detecting cheaters. The
87	above-mentioned schemes all proposed an authentication ability to protect the
88	integrity of the shadow images. In 2010, Lin and Chan (2010) proposed an invertible
89	secret image sharing scheme that almost satisfied all of the essential criteria of the
90	secret image sharing mechanism. Also, their scheme offered a large embedding
91	capacity compared with related secret image sharing schemes.
92	However, most researchers have focused on how to improve the visual quality of
93	the shadow images and enlarge the embedding capacity, and very few people have
94	paid any attention to research on the access structure of secret image sharing. In 2002,

95 Tsai, Chang, and Chen (2002) proposed a multiple secret sharing method, in which 96 multiple secret images can be shared among participants and each pair of shadow 97 images can share a different secret image. But, their method can retrieve the secret \langle

98	image from only combinations of two shadow images. This is not a generalized secret
99	image sharing scheme. In 2005, Feng, Wu, Tsai, and Chu (2005) proposed a scheme
100	to achieve sharing multiple secrets according to any access structure, and each
101	qualified set of the shadow images can share different secret images independently.
102	However, Feng et al.'s scheme has following weaknesses. Firstly, the secret image
103	cannot be recovered without distortion since all the pixels larger than 250 need to be
104	modified to 250 in the secret sharing phase. Secondly, Feng et al.'s secret image
105	sharing scheme is not perfect. That is, an attacker has a probability to get a correct
106	secret image from an incomplete qualified subset of shadow images. Thirdly, the
107	embedding capability of their scheme is instability. The radio of total secret capacity
108	is within [1/2, 1]. In 2008, Feng, Wu, Tsai, and Chang (2008) also proposed a visual
109	secret sharing scheme for hiding multiple secret images into two share images.
110	The access structure Γ of a secret sharing scheme is the collections of subsets of
111	participant set P that can jointly compute the secret from their shadows. The
112	characterization of the access structures of secret sharing schemes is one of the most
113	important remaining problems in secret sharing. Due to the difficulty of finding
114	efficient secret sharing schemes with generalized access structures, it is worthwhile to
115	find families of access structures that have other useful properties for the applications
116	of threshold cryptology. However, there are very few known constructions of secret

117 image sharing schemes with generalized access structures. Therefore, we believe that

- 118 it will be an interesting and challenging problem.
- 119 In the introductory work (Shamir, 1979), Shamir made the first attempt to propose a 120 way to construct weighted threshold secret sharing. In his scheme, one positive weight 121 is associated with each participant, and the secret can be reconstructed if, and only if, 122 the sum of the weights assigned to participants who are reconstructing the secret is 123 greater than or equal to a fixed threshold. Brickell (1990) proposed a method for 124 constructing secret sharing schemes for multi-level and compartmented access 125 structures. These two kinds of access structures were also proposed by Simmons 126 (1990). In 2007, Farràs, Farré, and Padró (2007) presented a characterization of 127 matroid-related, multipartite access structures in terms of discrete polymatroids. Also, 128 they proposed an ideal multipartite secret sharing scheme. In 2007, Tassa (2007) 129 proposed a hierarchical threshold secret sharing scheme based on the Birkhoff 130 interpolation. In his scheme, the secret is shared by a set of participants partitioned into several levels, and the secret can be reconstructed by satisfying a sequence of 131 132 threshold requirements.

In 1996, Jackson, Martin, and O'Keefe (1996) considered a kind of secret sharing scheme that permits a number of different secrets to be shared among a group of participants. Each secret is associated with a (potentially different) access structure,

136	and a certain secret can be reconstructed by any group of participants from its
137	associated access structure. Barwick and Jackson (2005) talked about the construction
138	of a multi-secret threshold scheme in 2005. In 2011, Hsu, Cheng, Tang, and Zeng
139	(2011) proposed an ideal multi-threshold secret sharing scheme based on monotone
140	span programs (MSP). Later, they utilized the multi-threshold secret sharing scheme
141	to provide secure and efficient group communication in wireless mesh networks (Hsu
142	et al., 2011). Some secret sharing applications must protect more than one secret,
143	possibly with different access structures associated with each secret. Also, secret
144	image sharing has the same applications. For example, there are several secret images
145	that must be shared among a group of people in such a way that different subsets of
146	the group can cooperate to reconstruct the corresponding secret image. Inspired by the
147	multi-threshold secret sharing scheme, we want to construct a multi-threshold secret
148	image sharing scheme.

To the best of our knowledge, very few papers have discussed secret image sharing with a generalized access structure. In this paper, we study the characterization of the multi-threshold access structure and propose a new multi-threshold secret image sharing scheme based on MSP. In the process of driving shadow images, according to the real situation, we pre-defined the corresponding access structures. Then, we utilized Hsu et al.'s multi-threshold secret sharing scheme based on MSP to generate

155	the corresponding shadow data. Then, we used the least significant bits (LSB)
156	replacement to embed the shadow data into the cover image, aiming to generate the
157	shadow images. According to the access structures, each secret image is associated
158	with a certain subset of shadow images. The main contribution of this paper is to
159	propose a novel multi-threshold secret image sharing scheme based on MSP. What's
160	more, the shared multiple secret images can be recovered losslessly, and the
161	embedding capability and the quality of shadow images are satisfactory.
162	2. Preliminary
163	In this section, first, we introduce monotone span programs (MSP), and then, we
164	briefly review the multi-secret sharing scheme based on MSP proposed by Hsu et al.
165	(2011), which is the major building blocks of our scheme.
166	2.1 Monotone span programs
167	In 1993, Karchmer and Wigderson (1993) introduced monotone span programs (MSP)
168	as a linear algebraic model that computes a function. Let $\mathcal{M}(\kappa, M, \psi)$ be an MSP,
169	where <i>M</i> is a $d \times l$ matrix over a finite field κ and
170	$\psi: \{1, 2, \dots, d\} \rightarrow P\{P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n\}$ is a surjective labeling map. We call d the size of the
171	MSP. For any subset $A \subseteq \{P_1, P_2,, P_n\}$, there is a corresponding characteristic vector
172	$\overrightarrow{\delta}_A = (\delta_1, \delta_2, \dots, \delta_n) \in \{0,1\}^n$. If, and only if, $P_i \in A$, $\delta_i = 1$. As to a target vector
173	$\vec{v} \in \kappa' \setminus (0, 0, \dots, 0)$, if, and only if, a monotone Boolean function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \to \{0, 1\}$,

174 $f(\vec{\delta}_A) = 1$, we can say that $\vec{v} \in span\{M_A\}$, where M_A consists of the rows ε of M

175 with $\psi(\varepsilon) \in A$, and $\vec{v} \in span\{M_A\}$ means that a vector \vec{w} exists such that

176 $\vec{v} = \vec{w}M_A$.

177 2.2 Hsu et al.'s multi-secret sharing scheme

- 178 Hsu et al. (2011) proposed an ideal multi-secret sharing scheme based on MSP. They
- 179 generalized the definition of an MSP to permit more than one target vector. Their
- 180 scheme consists of three phases:
- 181 (1) The set up phase
- 182 Assume that *m* secrets s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_m are shared among a set of participants
- 183 $P = \{P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n\}$ and that $s_i \in \kappa$. Let $\overline{\omega}$ be the collection of all non-empty subsets
- 184 of P. Suppose that $\varphi: \{s_1, s_2, \dots, s_m\} \to \overline{\omega}$ is a bijection that associates each element in
- 185 $\overline{\sigma}$. We can define such an *m*-tuple $\vec{\Gamma} = (\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, ..., \Gamma_m)$ of access structures as
- 186 follows:
- 187 $(\Gamma_j)_{\min} = \{\varphi(s_j)\}, \quad 1 \le j \le m.$

188 Denote $\overline{V} = \kappa^n$ as the *n*-dimensional linear space over κ . Given a basis 189 $\{e_1, e_2, \dots, e_n\}$ of \overline{V} , the mapping $v: \kappa \to \overline{V}$ can be constructed by $v(x) = \sum_{i=1}^n x^{i-1} e_i$. 190 Let $\overrightarrow{u_i} \in \{v(x) : x \in \kappa\}$, for $i=1,2,\dots,n$, be the *n*-dimensional vector associated with the 191 participant P_i , where $\overrightarrow{u_i}$ is the row vector distributed to participant P_i , for $1 \le i \le n$. 192 Let $\overrightarrow{v_j} = \sum_{\substack{i \in \rho(j) \\ x \in \kappa}} x_i \overrightarrow{u_i}$, for $j = 1,2,\dots,m$, be the *m* target vectors.

193 (2) The distribution phase

194 First, the dealer computes a vector $\vec{r} \in \kappa^n$ that satisfies the inner product $(\vec{v_j}, \vec{r}) = s_j$,

- 195 for j = 1, 2, ..., m. Then, the dealer computes $M_i \vec{r}$ for participant P_i and transmits
- 196 $M_i \vec{r}^{\tau}$ to each P_i as a shadow, for i = 1, 2, ..., n, where " τ " is the transpose and M_i
- 197 denotes the matrix *M* restricted to the row *i*.
- 198 (3) The reconstruction phase
- 199 As to a qualified set of participants A, since $\vec{v_i} \in \sum_{i \in A} V_i$, where V_i is the space
- spanned by the row vectors of *M* distributed to participants *i* according to ψ , a vector

201 \vec{w} exists such that $\vec{v_j} = \vec{w}M_A$. The participants in A can compute

- 202 $s_j = (\vec{v}_j, r) = \vec{v}_j \cdot \vec{r} = (\vec{w}M_A)\vec{r} = \vec{w}(M_A\vec{r})$. Therefore, the secret s_j can be
- 203 reconstructed by a linear combination of the participants' shadows.
- 204 **3.** The proposed scheme

In the proposed scheme, we introduce MSP-based, multi-threshold secret sharing into secret image sharing, aiming at constructing a multi-threshold secret image sharing scheme in which there are multiple access structures on the set of shadow images, and the multiple secret images are shared among the shadow images in such a way that a different secret image is related to a corresponding access structure. That is, a different set of shadow images is likely to reconstruct different secret images.

211 Based on Hsu et al.'s multi-secret sharing scheme, we define the multi-threshold

- 212 secret image sharing as follows:
- 213 **Definition 1.** Let *I* be a set of *n* shadow images and let $\vec{\Gamma} = (\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, ..., \Gamma_m)$ be an
- 214 *m*-tuple of access structures on the set of $I = \{I_1, I_2, ..., I_n\}$. There are *m* secret images
- 215 s_1, s_2, \dots, s_m , and each secret image s_i is associated with an access structure Γ_i on I,
- 216 for $1 \le i \le m$. A qualified set of shadow images can reconstruct the corresponding
- 217 secret image jointly.
- For instance, assume that there is one set of shadow images $I = \{I_1, I_2, I_3\}$, and
- 219 there is a set of three secret images $S = \{S_1, S_2, S_3\}$, which are shared in such a 3-tuple
- 220 $\Gamma = (\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \Gamma_3)$ of access structures on *I* as follows:

221
$$(\Gamma_1)_{\min} = \{\{I_1, I_2\}\}, \ (\Gamma_2)_{\min} = \{\{I_2, I_3\}\}, \text{ and } (\Gamma_3)_{\min} = \{\{I_1, I_3\}\}.$$

That is, shadow image I_1 and shadow image I_2 can jointly reconstruct the secret image S_1 , shadow image I_2 and shadow image I_3 can jointly reconstruct the secret image S_2 , and shadow image I_1 and shadow image I_3 can jointly reconstruct the secret image S_3 . Obviously, a subset $A \in I$ is likely to reconstruct more than one

secret image.

Assume that the cover image *O* has $M \times N$ pixels, $O = \{O_i | i = 1, 2, ..., (M \times N)\}$, and a set of secret images $S = \{S_1, S_2, ..., S_m\}$, and each secret image has $M_S \times N_S$ pixels. A dealer is responsible for constructing the access structures according to the real-life situation and generating related shadow images. In Section 3.1, we introduce

231 a method to generate the shadow data for different secret images and corresponding 232 access structures, and the embedding phase is presented in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 discusses how to retrieve the corresponding secret images from the qualified sets of 233 234 shadow images according to different access structures. 235 3.1 Shadow data generation phase Without loss of generality, $s_{11}, s_{21}, \dots, s_{m1}$, for $0 \le s_{j1} \le 255$, $1 \le j \le m$, denote the first 236 of secret images $S = \{S_1, S_2, \dots, S_m\}$, respectively, values 237 pixel and $\vec{\Gamma} = (\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \dots, \Gamma_m)$ denote the corresponding access structures. In our scheme, we 238 239 continue to use some parameters from Hsu et al.'s scheme. The dealer performs the 240 following steps: Step 1. Let $\overline{V} = \kappa^n$ be the *n*-dimensional linear space over κ . Given a basis 241 $\{e_1, e_2, \dots, e_n\}$ of \overline{V} , the mapping $v: \kappa \to \overline{V}$ can be constructed by $v(x) = \sum_{i=1}^n x^{i-1} e_i$. 242 Step 2. Let $\overline{u_i} \in \{v(x) : x \in \kappa\}$, for $1 \le i \le n$, be the *n*-dimensional vector associated 243 244 with the *i*th shadow image. Let $\vec{v}_j = \sum_{x_i \in x} \vec{v}_i \vec{u}_i, \text{ for } j = 1, 2, \dots, m,$ 245 (1)246 be the *m* target vectors. Ž47 Step 3. The dealer can build an MSP $\mathcal{M}(\kappa, M, \psi)$, where M is an $n \times n$ matrix over κ with the *i*th row vector $\vec{u_i}$. 248 Step 4. The dealer can compute a vector $\vec{r} \in \kappa^n$ that satisfies the inner product 249

250 $(\vec{v_j}, \vec{r}) = s_j$, for j = 1, 2, ..., m. Then, the dealer computes $M_i \vec{r}$ for each shadow image,

251 for i = 1, 2, ..., n, where " τ " is the transpose and M_i denotes the matrix M restricted

252 to the row *i*. The $M_i \vec{r}$ is the corresponding shadow data for each shadow image I_i ,

253 for i = 1, 2, ..., n, in view of the first pixel values $s_{11}, s_{21}, ..., s_{m1}$ of secret images and

254 multi-threshold access structures
$$\Gamma = (\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, ..., \Gamma_m)$$

- 255 Step 5. By repeating Steps 1-4, the dealer can compute all shadow data according to
- the secret images and the access structures.
- In Section 3.2, we will talk about how to embed these shadow data into the cover image. In the following, we will give an example to illustrate how to generate the
- shadow data.

Example 1. Let $\vec{\Gamma} = (\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \Gamma_3)$ be a 3-tuple of access structures on the set of shadow images $I = \{I_1, I_2, I_3\}$. There are three secret images S_1, S_2, S_3 , and each secret image S_i is associated with an access structure Γ_i on *I*. Let s_{11}, s_{21} and s_{31} denote the first pixel values of the three secret images, respectively. The 3-tuple $\vec{\Gamma} = (\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \Gamma_3)$ of access structures on *I* is constructed as follows: $\Gamma_1 = \{\{I_1, I_2\}\}, \ \Gamma_2 = \{\{I_2, I_3\}\}$ and $\Gamma_3 = \{\{I_1, I_3\}\}.$

266 Assume that $s_{11} = 5$, $s_{21} = 100$ and $s_{31} = 50$. Give a basis $\{e_1, e_2, e_3\}$ of \overline{V} such

- 267 that $e_1 = (1,0,0)$, $e_2 = (0,1,0)$ and $e_3 = (0,0,1)$.
- 268 The mapping v can be defined by $v(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x^{i-1} e_i$.

269 Then, $v(x) = (1,0,0) + (0,1,0)x + (0,0,1)x^2$, and

270
$$M = \begin{bmatrix} v(1) \\ v(2) \\ v(3) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 2 & 4 \\ 1 & 3 & 9 \end{bmatrix}.$$

271 Associate I_1 with $\vec{u_1} = v(1)$, I_2 with $\vec{u_2} = v(2)$ and I_3 with $\vec{u_3} = v(3)$

272 According to (1), we can compute three target vectors $(\vec{v_1}, \vec{v_2}, \vec{v_3})$

273
$$\vec{v_1} = (2,3,5), \ \vec{v_2} = (2,5,13) \text{ and } \vec{v_3} = (2,4,10).$$

274 According to the equation $(\vec{v_i}, \vec{r}) = s_{i1}$, for i = 1,2,3, we can compute

275
$$\vec{r} = (-\frac{155}{2}, \frac{115}{2}, -\frac{5}{2}).$$

277

276 Then, the shadow data SD_i for each shadow image I_i can be computed as follows:

$$SD_{1} = M_{1}\vec{r}^{r} = (1,1,1) \begin{pmatrix} -\frac{155}{2} \\ \frac{155}{2} \\ -\frac{5}{2} \end{pmatrix} = -\frac{45}{2},$$
$$SD_{2} = M_{2}\vec{r}^{r} = \frac{55}{2},$$
$$SD_{3} = M_{3}\vec{r}^{r} = \frac{145}{2}.$$

278 We can see that the corresponding pixel value of the secret image s_{i1} , for i = 1,2,3,

279 can be reconstructed by computing a linear combination of their shadow data.

280
$$s_{11} = SD_1 + SD_2 = 5$$
, $s_{21} = SD_2 + SD_3 = 100$, and $s_{31} = SD_1 + SD_3 = 50$.

281 **3.2 Embedding phase**

282 As was mentioned above, according to the secret images and the corresponding access

283	structures, the dealer can compute shadow data for n shadow images. So far, the two
284	most popular steganographic embedding methods are the modular operation and the
285	least significant bits (LSB) replacement. Herein, we utilize the LSB-based
286	steganographic method to embed the shadow data into the cover image.
287	From the example in Section 3.1, we can find that these shadow data are real
288	numbers. In order to embed more shadow data into the cover image and recover the
289	secret image without distortion, we correct the shadow data to 1 decimal place. As we
290	know, the pixel value of the secret image can be reconstructed by a linear combination
291	of the corresponding shadow data, and the pixel value is an integer. Therefore, if we
292	correct the shadow data to 1 decimal place, the reconstructed pixel values will be
293	complete and correct. And then, the secret image can be recovered losslessly.
294	Firstly, the shadow data is divided into two parts: the integral part and the decimal
295	part. We utilize Lena, Baboon, and Airplane as the test images, and we can find that
296	the integral part of the corresponding shadow data are within [-78, 200], [-90, 171],
297	and [-45, 205], respectively. So, 10 bits are enough to represent the integral part of the
298	shadow data and 4 bits are enough to represent the decimal part of the shadow data. In
299	this paper, in order to simplify the proposed method, we utilize a simple 3-LSB
300	substitution to embed shadow data into the cover image. Therefore, five-pixel blocks
301	are enough to represent shadow data. Let o_i be the grayscale value of the cover

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302	image O and its binary representation be $(o_{i1}, o_{i2}, \dots, o_{i8})$, where o_{i6}, o_{i7}, o_{i8} are the
303	LSB bits. Let $(sd_{i1}, sd_{i2},, sd_{i10})$ be the binary representation of the integral part of
304	the shadow data SD_i , $(d_{i1}, d_{i2}, d_{i3}, d_{i4})$ be binary representation of the decimal part of
305	the shadow data SD_i , and o'_i be the grayscale value of the corresponding shadow
306	image. Fig. 1 shows one five-pixel square block of the cover image.

$o_i = (o_{i1}, o_{i2}, \dots, o_{i8})$	$o_{i+1} = (o_{(i+1)1}, o_{(i+1)2}, \dots, o_{(i+1)k})$
$o_{i+2} = (o_{(i+2)1}, o_{(i+2)2}, \dots, o_{(i+2)k})$	<i>O_{i+3}=(O_{(i+3)1},O_{(i+3)2},,O_{(i+3)8}</i>
$o_{i+4} = (o_{(i+4)1}, o_{(i+4)2}, \dots, o_{(i+4)k})$	

307 308

Fig. 1. The five-pixel square block of the cover image.

309

310 Fig. 2 demonstrates the five-pixel square block of the shadow image. Note that v_i 311 represents the sign of the corresponding shadow data: The symbol "0" means negative 312 and "1" means positive. The last four bits of the five-pixel square block are used to hide the decimal part of the shadow data $(d_{i1}, d_{i2}, d_{i3}, d_{i4})$, and other LSB bits are 313

314 replaced by $sd_{i1}, sd_{i2}, \dots, sd_{i10}$.



We embed the generated shadow data into the cover image in this manner. Repeat

the above procedure until all shadow data are embedded.

320 **3.3 Protection phase**

- 321 One fraudulent participant may provide a false shadow image and fool the other
- 322 participants during the recovery of the secret image. Therefore, it is important to
- 323 verify the integrity of the shadow images. In our scheme, the dealer can publish a little
- 324 public information for shadow images that can be used to prevent the dishonest
- 325 participants.
- 326 Step 1. Choose a public collision-free one-way hash function h(x) and a large prime
- 327 number q such that h(x) < q.
- 328 Step 2. Compute $T = \sum_{i=1}^{n} h(\tilde{O}_i) q^{2(i-1)} + \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} c q^{2i-1}$, where \tilde{O}_i denotes the *i*th

329 shadow image, and c is a positive constant randomly chosen over GF(q).

330 Step 3. Publish T, h(x) and q.

331 **3.4 Secret image retrieving phase**

332 Firstly, each involved participant can perform the following steps to determine the

validity of the shadow images. Let G be a qualified subset of shadow images.

334 Step 1. Compute
$$T^* = \sum_{\tilde{O}_i \in G} h(\tilde{O}_i) q^{2(i-1)}$$

335 Step 2. For each shadow image $\tilde{O}_i \in G$, check whether $\left\lfloor \frac{T - T^*}{q^{2(i-1)}} \right\rfloor (\mod q) = 0$.

336 Step 3. If the equation holds, the shadow image is valid; otherwise, the shadow image

is tampered.

- 338 In this paper, we will not iterate the mathematical background of this authentication
- 339 mechanism. Readers can refer to the detail in Wu and Wu (1995).
- 340 According to access structures, given any qualified subset of shadow images, the
- 341 corresponding secret image can be reconstructed. Extract the shadow data from the
- 342 given shadow images, and the pixel value of the related secret image can be
- 343 reconstructed by computing a linear combination of their shadow data. By repeating
- 344 these processes, all pixel values of the secret image can be computed, and, the secret
- image can be reconstructed losslessly.

Example 2. Assume that the access structures are $\Gamma_1 = \{\{I_1, I_2\}\}, \Gamma_2 = \{\{I_1, I_3\}\}$ and

- 347 $\Gamma_3 = \{\{I_1, I_2, I_3\}\}$. The *i*th pixel values of the three secret images are denoted as s_{1i}, s_{2i}
- and s_{3i} , respectively, and the corresponding shadow data are SD_{i1} , SD_{i2} and SD_{i3} ,
- respectively. Then, the *i*th pixel values of the three secret images, s_{1i} , s_{2i} and s_{3i} , can
- 350 be computed as follows:
- 351 $s_{1i} = SD_{i1} + SD_{i2}$,
- 352 $s_{2i} = SD_{i1} + SD_{i3}$,
- 353 $s_{3i} = SD_{i1} + SD_{i2} + SD_{i3}$.

4. Experimental results and analysis

355 In this section, we conduct simulations to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed

356 scheme, and the results of these simulations are discussed.

4.1 Simulation results

358 In the experiments, we assumed that there were three secret images that are shared in 3-tuple $\vec{\Gamma} = (\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \Gamma_3)$ access structures on shadow images $I = (I_1, I_2, I_3)$ as 359 360 follows: $(\Gamma_1)_{\min} = \{\{I_1, I_2\}\}, \ (\Gamma_2)_{\min} = \{\{I_2, I_3\}\}, \text{ and } (\Gamma_3)_{\min} = \{\{I_1, I_3\}\}.$ 361 362 As shown in Fig. 3, the test images contain 15 gray-level images with sizes of 512×512 pixels. Fig. 4 shows three secret images, i.e., Lena, Baboon, and Airplane, 363 364 that are 200×200 pixels. Herein, the criterion for the visual quality of the shadow 365 images is the peak-signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR), which is defined as: $PSNR = 10 \log_{10}(\frac{255^2}{MSE}) \text{ dB},$ 366 (2) 367 where *MSE* is the mean-square error between the cover image and the shadow image. If the cover image consists of $M \times N$ pixels, *MSE* is defined as: 368

369
$$MSE = \frac{1}{M \times N} \sum_{j=1}^{M \times N} (p_j - p'_j)^2,$$
 (3)

370 where p_j is the original pixel value, and p'_j is the pixel value of the shadow

371 image

372





Table 1 lists the PSNR values of the shadow images with various test images using the given access structures. Since we utilize a simple LSB substitution to embed the shadow data into the cover image, the pixel values of the shadow images in the proposed scheme are slightly lower than those of the existing secret image sharing methods. However, our scheme presents a generalized threshold access structure for

- 381 secret image sharing. Furthermore, the distortion between the shadow images and the
- 382 cover image is acceptable.

383 Table 1

384 The PSNR value (dB) of the shadow images for test images.

cover image is acceptable.							
Table 1							
The PSNR value (dB) of the shadow images for test images.							
Test images	PSNR (dB)						
	Shadow image 1	Shadow image 2	Shadow image 3				
Bird	40.27	40.29	40.28				
Woman	40.21	40.17	40.23				
Lake	40.28	40.27	40.28				
Man	40.28	40.28	40.27				
Tiffany	40.33	40.34	40.33				
Peppers	40.26	40.28	40.26				
Lena	40.27	40.27	40.27				
Fruits	40.26	40.27	40.26				
Baboon	40.26	40.26	40.27				
Airplane	40.30	40.34	40.30				
Couple	40.27	40.27	40.27				
Crowd	40.20	40.15	40.21				
Cameraman	40.29	40.27	40.29				
Boat	40.29	40.30	40.29				
House	39.94	39.71	39.99				

385

In the experiment, we designed a specific access structure in which shadow image 1 386 387 and shadow image 2 can cooperate to reconstruct secret image 1, "Lena." Similarly, 388 shadow image 2 and shadow image 3 can cooperate to reconstruct secret image 2, 389 "Baboon," and shadow image 1 and shadow image 3 can cooperate to reconstruct 390 secret image 3, "Airplane." Of course, depending on the situation at hand, we also can 391 design other access structures. Fig. 5 shows the extracted secret images. We can see 392 that the secret images can be reconstructed losslessly. 393







(a) The reconstructed Pepper (b) The reconstructed Lena (c) The reconstructed Airplane **Fig. 5.** The reconstructed secret images.

394

395 4.2 Validity and security analysis

- 396 In this subsection, we analyze the validity and the security of the proposed
- 397 multi-threshold secret image sharing scheme.

Theorem 1. Any subset $A \in \Gamma_i$ of shadow data can reconstruct the pixel value of the

399 secret image S_j by a linear combination of their shadow data.

400 **Proof.** Observe that $V_i = span\{\vec{u}_i\}$ for $1 \le i \le n$, and $\vec{v}_j = \sum_{\substack{i \in \varphi(j) \\ x_i \in K}} \vec{u}_i$ for $1 \le j \le m$,

401 where $\vec{v_j}$ is a target vector associated with a pixel value of the secret image. They

402 imply that there must exist a linear combination of the vectors in $\sum_{i \in \varphi(j)} V_i$ such that

403 it equals to $\vec{v_j} = \sum_{\substack{i \in \varphi(j) \\ x_i \in \kappa}} x_i \vec{u_i}$. Namely, $\vec{v_j} = \sum_{\substack{i \in \varphi(j) \\ x_i \in \kappa}} x_i \vec{u_i} \in \sum_{i \in \varphi(j)} V_i$. Therefore, the pixel

404 value of the secret image can be reconstructed by a linear combination of a qualified405 subset of shadow data.

406 **Theorem 2.** The proposed scheme is a perfect multi-threshold secret image sharing 407 scheme, that is, any subset $B \notin \Gamma_j$ of shadow images cannot obtain any information 408 on the secret image S_j .

409 **Proof.** Due to the fact that $\vec{u_i}$ for $1 \le i \le n$ is the form $\mathbf{v}(x)$, where the vectors $\mathbf{v}(x)$

have Vandermonde coordinates with respect to the given basis of \overline{V} , and every set of 410 at most *n* vectors of the form $\mathbf{v}(x)$ is independent, we obtain that $\vec{u_1}, \vec{u_2}, \dots, \vec{u_n}$ are 411 linearly independent. Furthermore, $V_i = span\{\vec{u}_i\}$ for $1 \le i \le n$, and the target vector 412 $\vec{v_i} = \sum_{\substack{i \in \varphi(j) \\ x_i \in x^i}} x_i \vec{u_i}$. It implies that there is not a linear combination of their shadow data 413 414 such that it equals to the corresponding pixel value of the secret image. Therefore, any subset $B \notin \Gamma_i$ of shadow images cannot reconstruct the secret image S_i . 415 416 4.3 Discussion 417 In the traditional (t, n) secret image sharing schemes, the secret image is shared 418 among n shadow images, and only t or more shadow images can reconstruct the secret 419 image; if the number of shadow images is equal to or less than (t-1), the shadow 420 images cannot recover the secret image. However, a generalized threshold access 421 structure could have other useful properties for the application. In the proposed 422 scheme, we introduced multiple threshold access structures in secret image sharing. In 423 our scheme, we define multiple threshold access structures according to the real 424 situation, and every secret image is associated with a qualified subset of shadow 425 images. Different qualified subsets of shadow images with different access structures 426 can reconstruct different secret images. 427 The procedure of generating shadow images consists of two phases, i.e. the shadow

428 data generation phase and the embedding phase. In the shadow data generation phase,

429	we utilized Hsu et al.'s scheme based on MSP to generate shadow data with the
430	properties of multiple threshold access structures. Then, in order to simplify the
431	proposed scheme, we used a simple 3-LSB substitution to embed shadow data into the
432	cover image. Since the corresponding shadow data are real numbers, we divided these
433	shadow data into two parts: the integral part and the decimal part, to deal with.
434	Meanwhile, correcting the shadow data to 1 decimal place is able to effectively ensure
435	that the secret image can be reconstructed losslessly. Of course, many variations based
436	on LSB substitution also can be utilized to embed shadow data. It may be possible for
437	these steganographic methods to improve the visual quality of shadow images and
438	enlarge the embedding capacity. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to
439	provide all of the details associated with this issue.

- 440 Table 2
- 441 Comparisons of the related secret image sharing schemes.

Functionality	Tsai et al. (2002)	Feng et al. (2005)	Yang et al (2007)	Chang et al. (2008)	Lin et al. (2009)	Lin and Chan (2010)	Ours
Multi-secret image sharing	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Multi-threshold access structures	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Meaningful shadow image	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Quality of shadow images	39 dB	42 dB	41 dB	41 dB	44 dB	43 dB	40 dB
Lossless secret image	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Authentication	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Embedding capacity	$\frac{M \times N}{9} \times \frac{n(n-1)}{2}$	$[\frac{1}{2}, 1] \times M \times N$	$\frac{M \times N}{4}$	$\frac{M \times N}{4}$	$\frac{(t-3) \times M \times N}{3}$	$\frac{(t-1) \times M \times N}{\left\lceil \log_{\sigma} 255 \right\rceil}$	$\frac{M \times N}{5} \times m$

443	Table 2 gives the functionality comparison of our scheme and the related schemes. As
444	presented in Table 2, the shadow images are meaningful, the visual quality of the
445	shadow images is acceptable, as is the embedding capacity, and the secret image can
446	be recovered without distortion. Tsai et al.'s scheme (2002) and Feng et al.'s scheme
447	(2005) proposed two effective ways to share multiple secret images, respectively.
448	These image sharing schemes had some additional advantages, but they also had to
449	withstand some shortcomings, such that the secret hidden capacity is limited and their
450	schemes did not provide the authentication ability. Compared with Tsai et al.'s scheme
451	(2002) and Feng et al.'s scheme (2005), our proposed scheme achieves higher
452	flexibility in various applications, and the secret image can be recovered losslessly. In
453	addition, our proposed scheme provides authentication ability by publishing a little
454	public information. The related works (Yang et al., 2007; Chang et al., 2008) achieved
455	the authentication ability to verify the integrity of the shadow images by embedding
456	some authentication bits into the shadow images. For Lin et al.'s scheme (2009), they
457	prevented the dishonest participants by generating an additional certificate for each
458	shadow image. In order to improve the quality of shadow images, increase the
459	capacity of the embedded secret data, and retrieve the lossless secret image, Lin and
460	Chan's scheme (2010) did not consider the authentication ability that prevents
461	dishonest participants from cheating.

462	Compared with related schemes, our scheme not only satisfies all of these essentials,
463	but also can share multiple secret images simultaneously and provide multiple
464	threshold access structures.
465	5. Conclusions
466	In this paper, we proposed a multi-threshold secret image sharing scheme based on
467	MSP. The main objective was to construct a multi-threshold access structure in secret
468	image sharing. In our scheme, we can pre-define different access structures, and each
469	secret image is associated with an access structure on shadow images. Meanwhile, in
470	the secret image retrieving phase, we also provide an authentication mechanism to
471	verify the integrity of the shadow images. And, each authorized subset of shadow
472	images can reconstruct the corresponding secret image without distortion. The
473	experimental results showed that the proposed scheme is feasible and that it also can
474	achieve both the high visual quality of the shadow images and high embedding
475	capacity.

476 It would be worthwhile to conduct research to determine how to construct an 477 efficient secret sharing scheme for every given access structure. However, the 478 problem of setting up secret image sharing schemes with generalized access structures 479 has been largely ignored by researchers in this area. We hope that some innovative 480 and ingenious approaches will be found by investigating and studying this problem.

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530 **Research Highlights**

- 531
- 532 > The proposed scheme can share multiple secret images. > We can construct multiple
- 533 threshold access structures. > Each secret image can be related to a corresponding
- and its struct the str