摘要

How to model the evolution of cooperation within the population is an important and interdisciplinary issue across the academia. In this paper, we propose an improved public goods game model with reputation effect on spatial lattices to investigate the evolution of cooperation regarding the allocation of public resources. In our model, we modify the individual utility or fitness as a product of the present payoff and reputation-related power function, and strategy update adopts a Fermi-like probability function during the game evolution. Meanwhile, for an interaction between a pair of partners, the reputation of a cooperative agent will be accrued beyond two units, but the defective player will decrease his reputation by one unit. Extensive Monte Carlo numerical simulations indicate the introduction of reputation will foster the formation of cooperative clusters, and greatly enhance the level of public cooperation on the spatial lattices. The larger reputation factor leads to the higher cooperation level since the reputation effect will be enormously embedded into the utility evaluation under this scenario. The current results are vastly beneficial to understand the persistence and emergence of cooperation among many natural, social and synthetic systems, and also provide some useful suggestions to devise the feasible social governance measures and modes for the public resources or affairs.