A hyperintensional criterion of irrelevance

作者：Kraemer Stephan

来源：Synthese, 2017, 194(8): 2917-2930.

DOI：10.1007/s11229-016-1078-0

• Relevance
• Hyperintensionality
• Partial content
• Truthmaker semantics

On one important notion of irrelevance, evidence that is irrelevant in an inquiry may rationally be discarded, and attempts to obtain evidence amount to a waste of resources if they are directed at irrelevant evidence. The familiar Bayesian criterion of irrelevance, whatever its merits, is not adequate with respect to this notion. I show that a modification of the criterion due to Ken Gemes, though a significant improvement, still has highly implausible consequences. To make progress, I argue, we need to adopt a hyperintensional conception of content. I go on to formulate a better, hyperintensional criterion of irrelevance, drawing heavily on the framework of the truthmaker conception of propositions as recently developed by Kit Fine.

• 出版日期2017-8