Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces

作者：Norman Thomas W L^*

来源：Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, 62(2): 610-627.

DOI：10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.005

• replicator dynamics
• evolutionary stability
• continuous strategy spaces
• stable sets

Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze [Bomze, I., 1990. Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability. Monatsh. Math. 110, 189-206] and Oechssler and Riedel [Oechssler, J., Riedel, E, 2001. Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces. Econ. Theory 17, 141-162] provide conditions for the stability of rest points under the replicator dynamics. Here, conditions are given for the stability of sets of strategies under this process.

• 出版日期2008-3