Analyzing auction and bargaining mechanisms in e-procurement with supply quality risk

作者：Huang, He; Xu, Hongyan^*; Kauffman, Robert J.; Sun, Ning

来源：Operations Research Letters, 2013, 41(4): 403-409.

DOI：10.1016/j.orl.2013.04.003

• Auctions
• Bargaining
• E-procurement
• Mechanism design
• Quality
• Risk

We compare two mechanisms from the buyer's perspective in multi-attribute supply procurement, with verifiable and unverifiable quality of the supplies and risk aversion to deviation from acceptable quality: an auction mechanism and a generalized Nash bargaining mechanism. We develop a model to represent the effects on the buyer's dominant strategy of bargaining and auction participation. The results suggest the conditions for which bargaining is preferred over the auction mechanism alone.

• 出版日期2013-7
• 单位重庆大学; 上海财经大学