科研之友
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摘要
Health care systems increasingly aim to create value for money by simultaneous incentivizing of quality along with classical goals such as activity increase and cost containment. It has recently been suggested that letting health care professionals choose the performance metrics on which they are evaluated may improve value of care by facilitating greater employee initiative, especially in the quality domain. There is a risk that this strategy leads to loss of performance as measured by the classical goals, if these goals are not prioritized by health care professionals. In this study we investigate the performance of eight hospital departments in the second largest region of Denmark that were delegated the authority to choose their own performance focus during a three-year test period from 2013 to 2016. The usual activity-based remuneration was suspended and departments were instructed to keep their global budgets and maintain activity levels, while managing according to their newly chosen performance focuses. Our analysis is based on monthly observations from two years before to three years after delegation. We collected data for 32 new performance indicators chosen by hospital department managements; 11 new performance indicators chosen by a centre management under which 5 of the departments were organised; and 3 classical indicators of priority to the central administration (activity, productivity, and cost containment). Interrupted time series analysis is used to estimate the effect of delegation on these indicators. We find no evidence that this particular proposal for giving health care professionals greater autonomy leads to consistent quality improvements but, on the other hand, also no consistent evidence of harm to the classical goals. Future studies could consider alternative possibilities to create greater autonomy for hospital departments.
- 出版日期2018-1
