A Greedy Double Auction Mechanism for Grid Resource Allocation

作者：Ding Ding^*; Luo Siwei; Gao Zhan

来源：15th Workshop on Job Scheduling Strategies for Parallel Processing, 2010-04-23 to 2010-04-23.

To improve the resource utilization and satisfy more users, a Greedy Double Auction Mechanism(GDAM) is proposed to allocate resources in grid environments. GDAM trades resources at discriminatory price instead of uniform price, reflecting the variance in requirements for profits and quantities. Moreover, GDAM applies different auction rules to different cases, over-demand, over-supply and equilibrium of demand and supply. As a new mechanism for grid resource allocation, GDAM is proved to be strategy-proof, economically efficient, weakly budget-balanced and individual rational. Simulation results also confirm that GDAM outperforms the traditional one on both the total trade amount and the user satisfaction percentage, specially as more users are involved in the auction market.

• 出版日期2010
• 单位北京交通大学