摘要

With the in-depth shift from an industry-based society to a knowledge-based one, innovative companies use their own patents to create and exploit new opportunities. In recent years, leading innovative companies have attempted to establish an inter-enterprises patent portfolio alliance (such as patent pool and so on) and create leveraging opportunities through patent portfolio behavior. In this paper, we consider the question of how many firms and when can implement its patent portfolio behavior for different market structures with homogeneous patential products. Based on the classical Cournot model, we propose an economic game mode and analyze the above question. We find that the profits of the firms that have established a patent portfolio alliance is increasing but also the profits change of the firms that have not established the same patent portfolio alliance is uncertain when compare with the situation with both non -establishing the same patent portfolio alliance and Cournot competition. We also find that there is a minimum moderate number scale of the firms that have established an inter-enterprise patent portfolio alliance within the industries whose enterprises numbers are different. These conclusions not only explain patent portfolio behavior of some innovative firms such as those in the DVD industry(1) but also have its potential generalization to some innovative companies and considering how it can be used to indicate profits drivers for inter-enterprises patent portfolio behaviors.

  • 出版日期2017-7
  • 单位南京审计大学