A Kuhnian defence of inference to the best explanation

作者：Walker David^*

来源：Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2012, 43(1): 64-73.

DOI：10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.09.007

• Exemplar
• Explanatory virtue
• IBE
• Kuhn
• Loveliness

According to inference to the best explanation (IBE), scientists infer the loveliest of competing hypotheses, %26apos;loveliness%26apos; being explanatory virtue. This generates two key objections: that loveliness is too subjective to guide inference, and that it is no guide to truth. I defend IBE using Thomas Kuhn%26apos;s notion of exemplars: the scientific theories, or applications thereof, that define Kuhnian normal science and facilitate puzzle-solving. I claim that scientists infer the explanatory puzzle-solution that best meets the standard set by the relevant exemplar of loveliness. Exemplars are the subject of consensus, eliminating subjectivity; divorced from Kuhnian relativism, they give loveliness the context-sensitivity required to be truth-tropic. The resulting account, %26apos;Kuhnian IBE%26apos;, is independently plausible and offers a partial rapprochement between IBE and Kuhn%26apos;s account of science.

• 出版日期2012-3