A two-sided reputation result with long-run players

作者：Atakan Alp E; Ekmekci Mehmet^*

来源：Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, 148(1): 376-392.

DOI：10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.007

• Repeated games
• Reputation
• Equal discount factor
• Long-run players
• War of attrition

We establish reputation results, under two sided incomplete information, for a class of repeated games. We consider a repeated game that satisfies the assumptions of either Atakan and Ekmekci (2012) [3] or Cripps et al. (2005) [6] and we assume that both players are Stackelberg types with positive probability. If the stage game is not a common interest game, then equilibrium play converges to the unique equilibrium of a continuous time war of attrition as the stage game is repeated arbitrarily frequently. Alternatively, if the stage game is a common-interest game, then the players' equilibrium payoffs converge to their highest payoffs as the stage game is repeated arbitrarily frequently.

• 出版日期2013-1
• 单位西北大学