摘要

Agricultural irrigators and industrial water users are two kinds of subjects in the market of water rights trading. In this paper, evolutionary game method and multi-agent simulation were used to analyze the non-collaborating and coopetitive behavior of these two kinds of agents. The main conclusions of this study are increased benefits are brought by collaboration and the reward and punishment will promote the development of co-operation. The greater these values are, the more the collaboration can be promoted. When one party chooses to collaborate and other chooses to non-collaborate, non-collaborative benefit and collaborative loss will promote the non-collaboration. The bigger these values are, the harder they are to collaborate. The more the impartial new profit is distributed, the more the collaboration can be promoted. Collaborative tactics have a strong advantage when the benefits of collaboration far outweigh non-collaborative benefits. Finally, based on the conclusions, suggestions for promoting the collaboration between agricultural irrigators and industrial water users were put forward in a targeted manner.