Ambiguous language and common priors

作者：Halpern Joseph Y; Kets Willemien^*

来源：Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, 90: 171-180.

DOI：10.1016/j.geb.2015.01.007

• Ambiguous language
• Common prior
• Agree to disagree
• Harsanyi doctrine

Standard economic models cannot capture the fact that information is often ambiguous, and is interpreted in multiple ways. Using a framework that distinguishes between the language in which statements are made and the interpretation of statements, we demonstrate that, unlike in the case where there is no ambiguity, players may come to have different beliefs starting from a common prior, even if they have received exactly the same information, unless the information is common knowledge.

• 出版日期2015-3
• 单位西北大学