Nash bargaining and leader-follower models in water allocation: Application to the Zarrinehrud River basin, Iran

作者：Safari Nasim; Zarghami Mandi^*; Szidarovszky Ferenc

来源：Applied Mathematical Modelling, 2014, 38(7-8): 1959-1968.

DOI：10.1016/j.apm.2013.10.018

• Leader-follower game
• Nash bargaining solution
• Conflict resolution
• Water management
• Zarrinehrud River

Mathematical models for conflict resolution are very important in integrated water resources and environmental management. This study proposes a new methodology to resolve conflicts among different water users and water suppliers while considering environmental requirements and the system's constraints. A two-level leader follower model is applied to maximize the net benefit with the Iran Water Resources Management Company as the leader and agricultural, domestic, and industrial users as followers subject to the system's constraints. As a comparison, the Nash bargaining solution is also used to find a solution when simultaneous moves are assumed by the participants. The suggested method is then applied to the real case of the Zarrinehrud River basin that is one of the areas facing water shortages in Iran. For the actual optimization, Genetic Algorithm is used in order to avoid local optimum. As the contribution of this study, the results show that benefits for the leader in the leader follower model increased in comparison with the Nash bargaining solutions.

• 出版日期2014-4-1