科研之友
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摘要
Rural land expropriation in China has been a focus of attention at home and abroad due to its enormous magnitude and astonishing pace. It is generally observed that the excessive and sometimes abusive expropriation is in large part attributed to an absence of external control over expropriation decision-making by various levels of Chinese government. The system suffers from a built-in defect where expropriation decisions are immune to judicial review, legislative scrutiny and public participation. Consequently, popular reform proposals centre on introducing judicial, legislative and procedural democratic scrutiny over individual expropriation decisions. None of these proposals has been adopted so far, for which the conventional explanation rests in "land finance", a phrase describing the huge financial benefits accrued to the Chinese government through expropriating rural land. This article argues that the conventional wisdom is misguided and based on a misunderstanding of how rural land expropriation decisions are actually made in China. By examining the decision-making process, it demonstrates that under the present Chinese land use regulatory system, expropriation decisions are in effect reflecting and implementing spatial planning decisions that are neither completely "nonjusticiable nor free from legislative or democratic scrutiny. The failure of those prevalent reform proposals can be explained by their own deficiencies as much as by land finance. Alternative ways ought to be conceived to enhance external scrutiny over the state's expropriation power in China.
- 出版日期2015
- 单位北京大学
