Schizophrenia and alterations in first person experience: the convergence and divergence of six perspectives

作者：Lysaker P H^*; Lysaker J T

来源：PSN, 2011, 9(1): 31-40.

DOI：10.1007/s11836-010-0151-x

• Schizophrenia
• Self
• Phenomenology
• Rehabilitation
• Recovery

Contemporary researchers have tended to present psychosocial dysfunction in schizophrenia as a result of biological and social forces. While this has greatly advanced the knowledge base, we are still without a full account of the illness's first-person dimensions. As such, there is a risk of failing to grasp that schizophrenia is a disorder that interrupts the lives of people, making them struggle to find and create security and meaning. While literature from a range of sources has explored self-experience in schizophrenia, one barrier to the creation of a larger synthesis and application of this work is that it remains unclear whether, and to what degree, these differing views of self-experience are compatible. To address this issue, this paper reviews six different accounts of self-experience, a fundamental, first-person dimension of schizophrenia. They are early psychiatry, existential psychiatry, psychoanalysis, phenomenology, psychosocial rehabilitation, and dialogical psychology. After comparing and contrasting the six, we conclude that there is a wide ranging, in general consensus, which suggests that many suffering from schizophrenia experience themselves as diminished relative to their former selves-that is, after onset, they experience themselves as less able to engage the world effectively, which intensifies their anxieties in the face of everyday interactions. However, significant disagreement exists regarding the emergence and natural course of these difficulties. Do they predate the illness? Is recovery possible and if so, under what conditions? In the end, we suggest a program of research to create a richer account of first-person experience of schizophrenia.

• 出版日期2011-2