An application of Carnapian inductive logic to an argument in the philosophy of statistics

作者：Groves Teddy^*

来源：Journal of Applied Logic, 2014, 12(3): 302-318.

DOI：10.1016/j.jal.2014.05.002

• Inductive logic
• Carnap
• Popper
• Falsificationism
• Philosophy of statistics
• Model choice

I claim that an argument from the philosophy of statistics can be improved by using Carnapian inductive logic. Gelman and Shalizi [9] criticise a philosophical account of how statisticians ought to choose statistical models which they call %26apos;the received view of Bayesian inference%26apos; and propose a different account inspired by falsificationist philosophy of science. I introduce another philosophical account inspired by Carnapian inductive logic and argue that it is even better than Gelman and Shalizi%26apos;s falsificationist account.

• 出版日期2014-9