Anti-Jamming Transmission Stackelberg Game With Observation Errors

作者：Xiao Liang^*; Chen Tianhua; Liu Jinliang; Dai Huaiyu

来源：IEEE Communications Letters, 2015, 19(6): 949-952.

DOI：10.1109/LCOMM.2015.2418776

• Jamming
• Stackelberg game
• transmit power
• observation error
• Nash equilibrium

As smart jammers that can analyze the ongoing radio transmission with flexible and powerful control on jamming signals throw serious threats on cognitive radio networks, game theory provides a powerful approach to study the interactions between smart jammers and secondary users (SUs). In this work, the power control strategy of an SU against a smart jammer under power constraints is formulated as a Stackelberg game. The jammer as the follower of the game chooses the jamming power according to the observed ongoing transmission, while the SU as the leader determines its transmit power based on the estimated jamming power. The impact of the observation accuracy of the jammer regarding the transmit power of the SU is investigated. The Stackelberg equilibrium of the anti-jamming game is derived and compared with the Nash equilibrium of the game. Simulation results show that the transmission of an SU benefits from the observation error of the jammer with a higher signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio and utility.

• 出版日期2015-6
• 单位厦门大学