Analysis of urban car owners commute mode choice based on evolutionary game model

作者：Gong, Huawei^*; Jin, Wenzhou

来源：Journal of Control Science and Engineering, 2015, 2015: 291363.

DOI：10.1155/2015/291363

• Adjustment mechanisms
• Dynamic mechanism
• Evolutionary game models
• Evolutionary stable strategies
• Initial conditions
• Public transport
• Public transportation
• Transportation development

With the aggravation of the traffic congestion in the city, car owners will have to give up commuting with private cars and take the public transportation instead. The paper uses the replication dynamic mechanism to simulate the learning and adjustment mechanism of the automobile owners commuting mode selection. The evolutionary stable strategy is used to describe the long-term evolution of competition game trend. Finally we simulate equilibrium and stability of an evolution of the game under a payoff imbalance situation. The research shows that a certain proportion of car owners will choose public transit under the pressure of public transport development and heavy traffic, and the proportion will be closely related to the initial conditions and urban transportation development policy.

• 出版日期2015-2-26
• 单位华南理工大学