A Study on the Multi-Task Incentive Mechanism for the Service Provider

作者：Li Lei^*; Xin Zhanhong

来源：China Communications, 2008, 5(1): 79-83.

• service provider
• principal-agent analysis
• asymmetric information
• incentive mechanism

Both conflict and asymmetric information exist between the telecom operators and the service provider, and result in illegal behaviors of the service provider. The relationship between the telecom operators and the service provider is classical multi-task principal-agent relationship. The multi-task incentive for the service provider is considered in the design of the principal-agent incentive contract, and it is necessary to add the. multi-task incentive to the service providers through the analysis of the risk costs and the agency costs of this problem.

• 出版日期2008-3
• 单位北京大学