A convex representation of totally balanced games

作者：Bilbao J M; Martinez Legaz J E^*

来源：Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 2012, 387(2): 1167-1175.

DOI：10.1016/j.jmaa.2011.10.026

• Cooperative. games
• Indirect function
• Least increment function

We analyze the least increment function, a convex function of n variables associated to an n-person cooperative game. Another convex representation of cooperative games, the indirect function, has previously been studied. At every point the least increment function is greater than or equal to the indirect function, and both functions coincide in the case of convex games, but an example shows that they do not necessarily coincide if the game is totally balanced but not convex. We prove that the least increment function of a game contains all the information of the game if and only if the game is totally balanced. We also give necessary and sufficient conditions for a function to be the least increment function of a game as well as an expression for the core of a game in terms of its least increment function.

• 出版日期2012-3-15