科研之友
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摘要
Every finite extensive-form game with perfect information has a subgame-perfect equilibrium. In this note we settle to the negative an open problem regarding the existence of a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon and Borel measurable payoffs, by providing a counter-example. We also consider a refinement called strong subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium, and show by means of another counter-example, with a simpler structure than the previous one, that a game may have no strong subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium for sufficiently small epsilon %26gt; 0, even though it admits a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium for every epsilon %26gt; 0.
- 出版日期2014-11
- 单位西北大学
