A secure incentive protocol for mobile ad hoc networks

作者：Zhang Yanchao^*; Lou Wenjing; Liu Wei; Fang Yuguang

来源：Wireless Networks, 2007, 13(5): 569-582.

DOI：10.1007/s11276-006-6220-3

• mobile ad hoc networks
• selfishness
• incentive
• cooperation
• security

The proper functioning of mobile ad hoc networks depends on the hypothesis that each individual node is ready to forward packets for others. This common assumption, however, might be undermined by the existence of selfish users who are reluctant to act as packet relays in order to save their own resources. Such non-cooperative behavior would cause the sharp degradation of network throughput. To address this problem, we propose a credit-based Secure Incentive Protocol (SIP) to stimulate cooperation among mobile nodes with individual interests. SIP can be implemented in a fully distributed way and does not require any pre-deployed infrastructure. In addition, SIP is immune to a wide range of attacks and is of low communication overhead by using a Bloom filter. Detailed simulation studies have confirmed the efficacy and efficiency of SIP.

• 出版日期2007