A model of unsafe behavior in coal mines based on game theory

作者：Li Shuang^*; Wang Yao; Liu Qian

来源：International Journal of Mining Science and Technology, 2013, 23(1): 99-103.

DOI：10.1016/j.ijmst.2013.01.015

• Cost differences
• Expected values
• Intensity
• Monitoring and control
• Unsafe behaviors

Behavior choice, coal mine monitoring, and control intensity are combined in a general mathematical model established from the perspective of a behavioral game. A case study is provided with effective conditions of monitoring provided. This paper defines the expected value difference of control return and behavior cost difference and discusses the measurement and optimization of variable indexes, including the monitoring intensity and costs of control. The results imply that the control of unsafe behavior can be more effective when monitoring and control of coal mines are both improved. Monitoring will be useful when the rewards for displaying safe behavior, and the monitoring of unsafe behavior, are improved to a high level.

• 出版日期2013
• 单位中国矿业大学（北京）; 河海大学