Distribution of complementary assets and value appropriation of innovators

作者：Du Yi Fei^*; Li Shi Ming

来源：Control and Decision, 2010, 25(6): 808-813.

• Biform games
• Complementary assets
• Look-forward
• Lower bounds
• Two stage
• Upper Bound
• Value added

The relationship between the distribution of complementary assets and the value appropriation of innovator is analyzed by establishment of two-stage Biform game model. The interval preference condition, whose lower bound of value appropriation is replaced by the minimum residual of innovation and the upper bound is replaced by marginal value added, determines the choice of preference for innovator in the first phase of the model. The quantity of innovation product is given, and the value appropriation of the innovator is affected by the total size of the complementary assets, innovation competitive difference, the number of independent complementary agencies and the total competitive residual of innovation. Furthermore, innovators always look forward to working with the collection of all available independent complementary assets to establish the coalition.

• 出版日期2010
• 单位电子科技大学