科研之友
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摘要
Climate change represents the largest social dilemma humans have ever faced, where individual actors maximise their personal gain by emitting greenhouse gases into the atmosphere even though this is detrimental to the collective global good. Cooperation on a global scale is urgently required if we are to overcome this problem. However, this is difficult to achieve because cooperators pay the cost of reducing emissions while any benefits are shared between cooperators and free-riders alike. In a risk-free, rational world cooperative behaviour can be promoted through mechanisms that increase the benefit of cooperating relative to free-riding, such as rewards or sanctions. In reality, however, outcomes are seldom certain and humans rarely behave rationally when confronted with risky prospects. Here, we argue that effective policies to mitigate global climate change should incorporate mechanisms to foster cooperation, but also account for both uncertainty and irrational responses that may inhibit collective action.
- 出版日期2011-9
