Market power assessment in electricity markets: supply function equilibrium-based model

作者：Salarkheili Saeed; Foroud Asghar Akbari^*

来源：International Transactions on Electrical Energy Systems, 2013, 23(4): 553-569.

DOI：10.1002/etep.1612

• capacity withholding
• supply function equilibrium (SFE)
• forward contract
• demand elasticity

Because of the oligopoly structure of the electricity markets, the Generation Companies (GenCos) may exert market power by using bidding strategies such as capacity withholding. This brings the market clearing price higher and the quantity generated of the market lower. In this article, capacity withholding in an oligopolistic electricity market in that all GenCos bid in the supply function equilibrium model is analyzed and the capacity withheld index, the capacity distortion index and the price distortion index are formulated. Demand elasticity and forward contracts can significantly affect the GenCos' capacity withholding in the market. The potential ability of market for capacity withholding is measured by the distortion-withheld index proposed in this article. The finding in this article is helpful for market power monitoring and mitigating. A two-settlement market including a forward market and a spot market is used to describe GenCos' strategic forward contracting and spot market competition.

• 出版日期2013-5