At least not false, at most possible: between truth and assertibility of superlative quantifiers

作者：Spychalska Maria^*

来源：Synthese, 2018, 195(2): 571-602.

DOI：10.1007/s11229-014-0615-y

• Superlative quantifiers
• Comparative quantifiers
• Assertibility conditions
• Epistemic logic
• Disjunction

Generalized Quantifier Theory defines superlative quantifiers at most n and at least n as truth-conditionally equivalent to comparative quantifiers fewer than n+1 and more than n 1. It has been demonstrated, however, that this standard theory cannot account for various linguistic differences between these two types of quantifiers. In this paper I discuss how the distinction between assertibility and truth-conditions can be applied to explain this phenomenon. I draw a parallel between the assertibility of disjunctions and superlative quantifiers, and argue that those assertibility conditions are essentially modal. I use epistemic logic to formalize the assertibility conditions and revisit some of the linguistic puzzles related to superlative quantification.