Are politicians office or policy motivated? The case of US governors' environmental policies

作者：Fredriksson Per G^*; Wang Le; Mamun Khawaja A

来源：Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2011, 62(2): 241-253.

DOI：10.1016/j.jeem.2011.03.005

• Political economy
• Term limits
• Candidate motivation
• Elections
• Environmental spending
• States
• Regression discontinuity

Are elected politicians primarily motivated by holding office, thus choosing environmental policies accordingly? Or are they motivated by the chance to implement their environmental policies? Do governors have character, in the sense that they and implement environmental policies consistent with their own preferences? answer these questions, we study the differences in environmental spending across re-electable and lame duck governors from the two main political parties. In our analysis, we make use of parametric and non-parametric regression-discontinuity-approaches. While re-electable governors do not set significantly different lame duck governors do. We argue that in the area of environmental policy appear to be primarily office motivated and lack character.

• 出版日期2011-9