Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power

作者：Feng Xin; Lu Jingfeng^*

来源：Economics Letters, 2017, 159: 61-64.

DOI：10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.017

• Asymmetric players
• Discriminatory power
• Tullock contests
• Two-player contests
• Uniqueness of equilibrium

This paper provides a different approach to establish the uniqueness of equilibrium in Tullock contests between two players with asymmetric valuations, when the discriminatory power r is between 1 and 2. Our result complements that of Ewerhart (2017) in filling up the remaining gap in the literature on the uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests.

• 出版日期2017-10
• 单位对外经济贸易大学