Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations

作者：Miller Nolan H^*; Pratt John W; Zeckhauser Richard J; Johnson Scott

来源：Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 136(1): 476-496.

DOI：10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.005

• mechanism design
• interdependent valuations
• multidimensional types

We consider the mechanism design problem when agents' types are multi dimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule and any epsilon > 0 there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian epsilon-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures that there exist balanced transfers that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents' strategies are nearly truthful.

• 出版日期2007-9