A Note on the Private Core and Coalitional Fairness under Asymmetric Information

作者：Graziano Maria Gabriella^*; Pesce Marialaura

来源：Mediterranean Journal of Mathematics, 2010, 7(4): 573-601.

DOI：10.1007/s00009-010-0046-z

• Measure space of agents
• Asymmetric information economies
• Coalitional fair allocations
• Private core
• Restricted Walrasian expectations equilibria

We study relations among Walrasian expectations allocations, coalitional fair allocations and the private core of economies with uncertainty and asymmetric information. Our analysis covers finite exchange models, as well as models of mixed markets consisting of some large traders and an ocean of small traders. The adopted notion of coalitional fairness requires that: 1. Under a "c-fair" allocation, no coalition could benefit from achieving the net trade of some other disjoint coalition; 2. Coalition bargaining takes place without information sharing among agents. We introduce a notion of restricted Walrasian expectations allocation and examine its relations with c-fairness.

• 出版日期2010-12