The epistemological virtues of assumptions: towards a coming of age of Boltzmann and Meinong's objections to 'the prejudice in favour of the actual'?

作者：de Courtenay Nadine^*

来源：Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2010, 41(1): 41-57.

DOI：10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.12.010

• Assumption
• Hypothesis
• Description
• Mode of presentation
• Ludwig Boltzmann
• Alexius Meinong

Two complementary debates of the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century are examined here: the debate on the legitimacy of hypotheses in the natural sciences and the debate on intentionality and 'representations without object' in philosophy. Both are shown to rest on two core issues: the attitude of the subject and the mode of presentation chosen to display a domain of phenomena. An orientation other than the one which contributed to shape twentieth-century philosophy of science is explored through the analysis of the role given to assumptions in Boltzmann's research strategy, where assumptions are contrasted to hypotheses, axioms, and principles, and in Meinong's criticism of the privileged status attributed to representations in mental activities. Boltzmann's computational style in mathematics and Meinong's criticism of the confusion between representation and judgment give prominence to an indirect mode of presentation, adopted in a state of suspended belief which is characteristic of assumptions and which enables one to grasp objects that cannot be reached through direct representation or even analogies. The discussion shows how assumptions and the movement to fiction can be essential steps in the quest for objectivity. The conclusion restates the issues of the two debates in a contemporary perspective and shows how recent developments in philosophy of science and philosophy of language and mind can be brought together by arguing for a twofold conception of reference.

• 出版日期2010-3