Markov-Perfect Rent Dissipation in Rights-Based Fisheries

作者：Valcu Adriana; Weninger Quinn^*

来源：Marine Resource Economics, 2013, 28(2): 111-131.

DOI：10.5950/0738-1360-28.2.111

• Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium
• individual transferable quotas
• production externalities
• resource rent

We present a general dynamic model of within-season harvesting competition in a fishery managed with individual transferable quotas. Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) harvesting and quota purchase strategies are derived using numerical collocation methods. We identify rent loss caused by a heterogeneous-in-value fish stock congestion on the fishing ground, revenue competition, and stock uncertainty. Our results show that biological, technological, and market conditions under which rents will be dissipated in a standard individual transferable quota program are fairly special. We offer new insights for designing rights-based programs capable of generating resource rent in marine fisheries.

• 出版日期2013