Golden-Free Hardware Trojan Detection with High Sensitivity Under Process Noise

作者:Hoque Tamzidul*; Narasimhan Seetharam; Wang Xinmu; Mal Sarkar Sanchita; Bhunia Swarup
来源:Journal of Electronic Testing-Theory and Applications, 2017, 33(1): 107-124.
DOI:10.1007/s10836-016-5632-y

摘要

Malicious modification of integrated circuits in untrusted design house or foundry has emerged as a major security threat. Such modifications, popularly referred to as Hardware Trojans, are difficult to detect during manufacturing test. Sequential hardware Trojans, usually triggered by a sequence of rare events, represent a common and deadly form of Trojans that can be extremely hard to detect using logic testing approaches. Side-channel analysis has emerged as an effective approach for detection of hardware Trojans. However, existing side-channel approaches suffer from increasing process variations, which largely reduce the detection sensitivity and sets a lower limit of the sizes of Trojans detectable. In this paper, we present TeSR, a Temporal Self-Referencing approach that compares the current signature of a chip at two different time windows to isolate the Trojan effect. Since it uses a chip as a reference to itself, the method completely eliminates the effect of process noise and other design marginalities (e.g. capacitive coupling), thus providing high detection sensitivity for Trojans of varying size. Furthermore, unlike most of the existing approaches, TeSR does not require a golden reference chip instance, which may impose a major limitation. Associated test generation, test application, and signature comparison approaches aimed at maximizing Trojan detection sensitivity are also presented. Simulation results for three complex sequential designs and three representative sequential Trojan circuits demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach under large inter- and intra-die process variations. The approach is also validated with current measurement results from several Xilinx Virtex-II FPGA chips.

  • 出版日期2017-2