Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion

作者：Abizada Azar^*; Chen Siwei

来源：Review of Economic Design, 2015, 19(1): 47-66.

DOI：10.1007/s10058-014-0163-4

• College admissions
• Eligibility
• Quasi-stability
• Justifiable-stability
• Strategy-proofness

We study college admissions with an eligibility criterion. Each college has strict preferences over the sets of students and each student has strict preferences over the colleges. Each student receives a score from a central exam. The students are endogenously divided into two groups: those who are eligible to apply to colleges, and those who are not. Eligibility respects the students' scores. We extend the college admissions model with eligibility criterion studied by Perach and Rothblum in Int (J Game Theory 39:657-667 (2010)) to a general case where different students may obtain the same scores from the central exam. We introduce three notions of stability that respect eligibility. We define three new rules based on the McVitie-Wilson algorithm, each of which satisfies different notions of stability. We also study incentive compatibility. We show that two of our rules are immune to strategic manipulations.

• 出版日期2015-3
• 单位中山大学