Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: Comment

作者：Kotowski Maciej H^*

来源：Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 72(2): 448-451.

DOI：10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.006

• First-price auctions
• Epsilon equilibrium
• Worst-case analysis

This note demonstrates epsilon equilibria in the first-price auction that achieve lower worst-case expected revenues than the lower bound proposed by Turocy (2008) (Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty, Games Econ. Behav. 62 (2008) 155-179). Additionally, it stresses the importance of a careful specification of the action space to properly characterize expected revenues when bidders systematically deviate from equilibrium play.

• 出版日期2011-6