An RSA-Based Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Secure against Replacement Attacks, and Its Extensions

作者：Shin SeongHan^*; Kobara Kazukuni; Imai Hideki

来源：IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences, 2010, E93A(6): 1086-1101.

DOI：10.1587/transfun.E93.A.1086

• authenticated key exchange
• passwords
• on-line/off-line dictionary attacks
• RSA
• leakage of stored secrets
• replacement attacks

Secure channels can be realized by an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol that generates authenticated session keys between the involving parties. In [32], Shin et al., proposed a new kind of AKE (RSA-AKE) protocol whose goal is to provide high efficiency and security against leakage of stored secrets as much as possible. Let us consider more powerful attacks where an adversary completely controls the communications and the stored secrets (the latter is denoted by "replacement" attacks). In this paper, we first show that the RSA-AKE protocol [32] is no longer secure against such an adversary. The main contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) we propose an RSA-based leakage-resilient AKE (RSA-AKE2) protocol that is secure against active attacks as well as replacement attacks; (2) we prove that the RSA-AKE2 protocol is secure against replacement attacks based on the number theory results; (3) we show that it is provably secure in the random oracle model, by showing the reduction to the RSA one-wayness, under an extended model that covers active attacks and replacement attacks; (4) in terms of efficiency, the RSA-AKE2 protocol is comparable to [32] in the sense that the client needs to compute only one modular multiplication with pre-computation; and (5) we also discuss about extensions of the RSA-AKE2 protocol for several security properties (i.e., synchronization of stored secrets, privacy of client and solution to server compromise-impersonation attacks).

• 出版日期2010-6