A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation

作者：Bahel Eric; Trudeau Christian^*

来源：International Journal of Game Theory, 2013, 42(2): 439-460.

DOI：10.1007/s00182-012-0320-3

• Cost sharing
• Demand
• Technology
• Cooperation
• Flow methods

This article proposes a setting that allows for technological cooperation in the cost sharing model. Dealing with discrete demands, we study two properties: additivity and dummy. We show that these properties are insufficient to guarantee a unit-flow representation similar to that of Wang (Econ Lett 64:187-192, 1999). To obtain a characterization of unit flows, we strengthen the dummy axiom and introduce a property that requires the cost share of every agent to be non-decreasing in the incremental costs generated by their demand. Finally, a fairness requirement as to the compensation of technological cooperation is examined.

• 出版日期2013-5