A game-theoretic approach to the financial benefits of infrastructure-as-a-service

作者：Kuensemoeller Jorn; Karl Holger

来源：Future Generation Computer Systems-The International Journal of eScience, 2014, 41: 44-52.

DOI：10.1016/j.future.2014.03.005

• Cloud computing
• Markets
• Game theory
• Pricing
• Infrastructure

Financial benefits are an important factor when cloud infrastructure is considered to meet processing demand. The dynamics of on-demand pricing and service usage are investigated in a two-stage game model for a monopoly Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) market. The possibility of hybrid clouds (public clouds plus own infrastructure) turns out to be essential in order that not only the provider but also the clients have significant benefits from on-demand services. Even if the client meets all demand in the public cloud, the threat of building a hybrid cloud keeps the instance price low. This is not the case when reserved instances are offered as well. Parameters like load profiles and economies of scale have a huge effect on likely future pricing and on a cost-optimal split-up of client demand between either a client's own data center and a public cloud service or between reserved and on-demand cloud instances.

• 出版日期2014-12