科研之友
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摘要
During the 2007-2011 economic downturn, the duration that one could collect unemployment insurance (UI) in the United States increased to an unprecedented 99 weeks, and the UI benefit amount increased by $25. This article explores the policy of increasing the generosity of UI during recessions using a model that accounts for the insurance and moral hazard implications of UI as well as the program's impact on job creation. When limited to adjusting the duration of benefits, a more generous UI system is optimal. However, due to UI's negative impact on job creation and the increased cost of providing benefits when unemployment is high, the optimal extension is just 1.3 months. When the government adjusts both the benefit amount and its duration, the optimal policy during downturns is a reduction in the replacement rate. This mitigates the decline in job creation and funds a UI extension of 4.3 months.
- 出版日期2013-1
