科研之友
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摘要
Previous literature shows that, in many different models, limits of equilibria of perturbed games are equilibria of the unperturbed game when the sequence of perturbed games converges to the unperturbed one in an appropriate sense. The question of whether such a limit property extends to the equilibrium notions in ambiguous games is not yet as clear as it seems; in fact, previous literature shows that the extension fails in simple examples. %26lt;br%26gt;The contribution in this paper is to show that the limit property holds for equilibria under ambiguous belief correspondences (presented by the authors in a previous paper). Key for our result is the sequential convergence assumption imposed on the sequence of belief correspondences. Counterexamples show why this assumption cannot be removed. Finally, we derive a limit result for equilibria in incomplete information games under ambiguity as a corollary of our main limit theorem.
- 出版日期2013-11
