A bankruptcy approach to the core cover

作者：Estevez Fernandez A; Fiestras Janeiro M G^*; Mosquera M A; Sanchez Rodriguez E

来源：Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2012, 76(3): 343-359.

DOI：10.1007/s00186-012-0409-2

• Cooperative game theory
• Compromise admissible games
• Bankruptcy
• Core cover
• Complexity

In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissible game and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromise admissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitionally stable allocations captured by an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity of the core cover and, consequently, of the core of a compromise stable game.

• 出版日期2012-12