科研之友
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摘要
Clatterbuck et al. (Biol Philos 28: 577-592, 2013) argue that there is no fact of the matter whether selection dominates drift or vice versa in any particular case of evolution. Their reasons are not empirically based; rather, they are purely conceptual. We show that their conceptual presuppositions are unmotivated, unnecessary and overly complex. We also show that their conclusion runs contrary to current biological practice. The solution is to recognize that evolution involves a probabilistic sampling process, and that drift is a deviation from probabilistic expectation. We conclude that conceptually, there are no problems with distinguishing drift from selection, and empirically-as modern science illustrates-when drift does occur, there is a quantifiable fact of the matter to be discovered.
- 出版日期2014-7
