Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention

作者：Freixas Josep; Tchantcho Bertrand^*; Tedjeugang Narcisse

来源：European Journal of Operational Research, 2014, 236(1): 254-260.

DOI：10.1016/j.ejor.2013.11.030

• Game theory
• (3,2) Voting rules
• Abstention
• Decision support systems
• Weightedness and completeness
• Hierarchies

It is well known that he influence relation orders the voters the same way as the classical Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices do when they are extended to the voting games with abstention (VGA) in the class of complete games. Moreover, all hierarchies for the influence relation are achievable in the class of complete VGA. The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we show that all hierarchies are achievable in a subclass of weighted VGA, the class of weighted games for which a single weight is assigned to voters. Secondly, we conduct a partial study of achievable hierarchies within the subclass of H-complete games, that is, complete games under stronger versions of influence relation.

• 出版日期2014-7-1