Apportioning indivisible damage and strategic diffusion of pollution abatement technology

作者：Li, Yi^*

来源：Journal of Economics, 2019, 126(1): 19-42.

DOI：10.1007/s00712-018-0610-8

• Strict liability
• Apportionment rule
• Technology diffusion
• Duopoly
• Environmental regulation

I examine the problem of apportioning liability among competing firms in an industry where the environmental damage is a joint product of the actions taken by all firms. In particular, I analyze the effect of alternative apportionment rules on adoption and strategic diffusion of pollution abatement technology. In a duopoly where industry wide technological diffusion is welfare enhancing, I characterize the second-best optimal apportionment rules. Inducing technology transfer requires placing a larger burden of the liability on the ex ante cleaner firm i.e., the one with a more efficient abatement technology.

• 出版日期2019-1
• 单位中南财经政法大学