Adaptive Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Adaptively Secure Oblivious Transfer

作者：Lindell Yehuda^*; Zarosim Hila

来源：Journal of Cryptology, 2011, 24(4): 761-799.

DOI：10.1007/s00145-010-9072-z

• Adaptive security
• Zero-knowledge proofs
• Oblivious transfer
• Black-box separations
• Minimal assumptions

In the setting of secure computation, a set of parties wish to securely compute some function of their inputs, in the presence of an adversary. The adversary in question may be static (meaning that it controls a predetermined subset of the parties) or adaptive (meaning that it can choose to corrupt parties during the protocol execution and based on what it sees). In this paper, we study two fundamental questions relating to the basic zero-knowledge and oblivious transfer protocol problems: Adaptive zero-knowledge proofs: We ask whether it is possible to construct adaptive zero-knowledge proofs (with unconditional soundness) for all of NP. Beaver (STOC [1996]) showed that known zero-knowledge proofs are not adaptively secure, and in addition showed how to construct zero-knowledge arguments (with computational soundness).
Adaptively secure oblivious transfer: All known protocols for adaptively secure oblivious transfer rely on seemingly stronger hardness assumptions than for the case of static adversaries. We ask whether this is inherent, and in particular, whether it is possible to construct adaptively secure oblivious transfer from enhanced trapdoor permutations alone.

• 出版日期2011-10