The Issue of No Moral Agency in Climate Change

作者：Scavenius Theresa^*

来源：Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 2017, 30(2): 225-240.

DOI：10.1007/s10806-017-9663-x

• Methodology of rational-individualism
• Self-interest theory
• Social dilemma theory
• Moral responsibility
• Climate change

The dominant methodological assumptions in climate ethical debates are rational-individualistic. The aim of this paper is to examine whether the rational-individualistic methodological framework is compatible with a theory of moral responsibility for climate change. I employ three fitness criteria of moral agency: (1) a normatively significant choice, (2) sufficient knowledge and (3) control. I demonstrate that the rational-individualistic methodology does not provide a framework in which rational agents meet the three criteria. I conclude that rational-individualistic agents are not fit to be held morally responsible for climate change. The paper demonstrates that the dominant climate-ethical view rests on a methodology that does not allow for a conceptualisation of a moral agent of climate change.

• 出版日期2017-4