Aftermath of bustamante attack on genomic beacon service

作者：Al Aziz Md Momin^*; Ghasemi Reza; Waliullah Md; Mohammed Noman

来源：BMC Medical Genomics, 2017, 10(S2): 43.

DOI：10.1186/s12920-017-0278-x

• Bustamante attack
• Genomic beacon service
• GA4GH genomic beacon
• Bustamante attack mitigation
• Human genomic data privacy
• Re-identification attack

Background: With the enormous need for federated eco-system for holding global genomic and clinical data, Global Alliance for Genomic and Health (GA4GH) has created an international website called beacon service which allows a researcher to find out whether a specific dataset can be utilized to his or her research beforehand. This simple webservice is quite useful as it allows queries like whether a certain position of a target chromosome has a specific nucleotide. However, the increased integration of individuals genomic data into clinical practice and research raised serious privacy concern. Though the answer of such queries are yes or no in Bacon network, it results in serious privacy implication as demonstrated in a recent work from Shringarpure and Bustamante. In their attack model, the authors demonstrated that with a limited number of queries, presence of an individual in any dataset can be determined.
Methods: We propose two lightweight algorithms (based on randomized response) which captures the efficacy while preserving the privacy of the participants in a genomic beacon service. We also elaborate the strength and weakness of the attack by explaining some of their statistical and mathematical models using real world genomic database. We extend their experimental simulations for different adversarial assumptions and parameters.
Results: We experimentally evaluated the solutions on the original attack model with different parameters for better understanding of the privacy and utility tradeoffs provided by these two methods. Also, the statistical analysis further elaborates the different aspects of the prior attack which leads to a better risk management for the participants in a beacon service.
Conclusions: The differentially private and lightweight solutions discussed here will make the attack much difficult to succeed while maintaining the fundamental motivation of beacon database network.

• 出版日期2017