Ambiguous implementation: the partition model

作者：de Castro Luciano I; Liu Zhiwei; Yannelis Nicholas C

来源：Economic Theory, 2017, 63(1): 233-261.

DOI：10.1007/s00199-016-1023-y

• Maximin preferences
• Maximin efficient allocations
• Maximin equilibrium
• Implementation

In a partition model, we show that each maximin individually rational and ex ante maximin efficient allocation of a single good economy is implementable as a maximin equilibrium. When there are more than one good, we introduce three conditions. If none of the three conditions is satisfied, then a maximin individually rational and ex ante maximin efficient allocation may not be implementable. However, as long as one of the three conditions is satisfied, each maximin individually rational and ex ante maximin efficient allocation is implementable. Our work generalizes and extends the recent paper of de Castro et al. (Games Econ Behav 2015. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.010).).

• 出版日期2017-1
• 单位首都经济贸易大学