Neural Lie Detection, Criterial Change, and OrdinaryLanguage

作者：Nadelhoffer Thomas^*

来源：Neuroethics, 2011, 4(3): 205-213.

DOI：10.1007/s12152-010-9080-6

• Neurolaw
• Ordinary language
• Scientific discovery
• Lie detection

Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson have recently put forward several provocative and stimulating criticisms that strike at the heart of much work that has been done at the crossroads of neuroscience and the law. My goal in this essay is to argue that their criticisms of the nascent but growing field of neurolaw are ultimately based on questionable assumptions concerning the nature of the ever evolving relationship between scientific discovery and ordinary language. For while the marriage between ordinary language and scientific discovery is admittedly not always a happy one, it is an awkward union that nevertheless seems to work itself out with the passage of time. In the following pages, I will try to show that Pardo and Patterson's primary argumentative strategy ultimately depends on basic assumptions concerning the fixity of language that we should reject.

• 出版日期2011-11